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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PACER SPORT & CYCLE, INC., 
Respondent-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK MYERS and 
CARL W. MYERS, 
Appellant-Defendant. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein the appellant seeks a re-
versal of an order denying their motion to set aside 
a default judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, Judge Gordon R. Hall, 
entered default judgment against appellant. The Third 
District Court, Judge M. D. Jones, Judge Pro Tem, denied 
the motion of appellant to set aside the default judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the order denying his 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Carl W. Myers, will hereinafter be 
referred to as "Carl Myers". Reference to Frank C. Myers 
will be "Frank Myers." The respondent, Pacer Sport & 
Cycle, will hereafter be referred to as "Pacer Cycle". 
The Statement of Facts set forth in Carl Myers' brief 
present an entirely different case to this Court than was 
presented to the trial court. There are few citations to 
the record because very few of the facts recited in Carl 
Myers* brief are in the record. 
Carl Myers' Statement of Facts centers around the 
claim that Pacer Cycle agreed to furnish Frank Myers with 
free motorcycles. Such an agreement is denied by Pacer 
Cycle and is inconsistent with the Sales Contract and Se-
curity Agreement (R. 49). Pacer Cycle had agreed to 
provide free labor involved in the service or repair of the 
motorcycle (exclusive of parts) and stood ready to per-
form such agreement at all times. However, Frank Myers 
did not take advantage of the free repair agreement be-
cause he was delinquent in paying for the motorcycle and 
therefore avoided all contact with Pacer Cycle. 
It is interesting to note that although Carl Myers 
argues the existence of agreement whereby the motorcycle 
was to be given to Frank Myers without charge, he is un-
willing to state under oath in his Affidavit that such an 
agreement existed. Nowhere in his Affidavit does he 
state the existence of an agreement that the motorcycle 
would be given to Frank without charge. This is because 
such an agreement never existed. 
2 
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The total record supporting the allegation that the 
motorcycle was to be given to Frank without charge, con-
sists of self serving allegations of such an agreement made 
by Carl Myers to counsel for Pacer Cycle after the default 
judgment was taken (R. 35-36). The alleged agreement 
was never mentioned at the time of demand for payment 
of the sales contract (R. 34-35) or at the time of service of 
summons (R. 35). 
Frank Myers' version of the facts has expanded during 
each phase of this proceeding. The present version of the 
facts bears no similarity whatsoever to other versions 
stated on previous occasions in this proceeding. 
Prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action, 
counsel for Pacer Cycle sent a demand letter to Carl Myers. 
In response to that letter Carl Myers contacted the attor-
ney for Pacer Cycle and stated that he would not pay the 
obligation since all of the benefits were realized by his 
son, Frank. (R. 34) On this occasion there was no men-
tion of any agreement whereby Pacer Cycle was to furnish 
free motorcycles to Frank Myers. On the contrary, Carl 
Myers admitted that his signature was necessary in order 
to obtain credit on behalf of his son (R. 34-35). 
After service of summons and Complaint on Carl 
Myers, he again contacted counsel for Pacer Cycle. On 
this occasion he was specifically informed that if he did 
not file an answer to the Complaint a default judgment 
would be taken against him which would be executed 
against his property (R. 35). He replied that he would 
not answer a complaint dealing with an obligation that 
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was primarily that of his son, Frank (R. 35). He was in-
structed to contact an attorney and respond to the Com-
plaint and was given every opportunity to ask any ques-
tions concerning the procedure to protect himself against 
a judgment (R. 35). There was no mention of any agree-
ment whereby Pacer Cycle was to furnish free motor-
cycles to his son. Rather, the emphasis was on the fact that 
his son was the one obligated under the contract and that 
by reason thereof the son should bear the responsibility 
(R. 35). There was some mention during this conversation 
that Pacer Cycle had agreed to provide free service and 
repair on the motorcycle, but no mention of any arrange-
ment for free motorcycles (R. 35). 
After the entry of default judgment, counsel for Pacer 
Cycle again contacted Carl Myers to advise him of the de-
fault judgment. This was the first time Carl Myers ever 
claimed the existence of an agreement whereby Pacer 
Cycle was to furnish free motorcycles to Frank Myers. The 
alleged agreement has always been denied by Pacer Cycle 
and is inconsistent with the provisions of the Sales con-
tract (R. 49). 
None of these conversations with counsel for Pacer 
Cycle were denied or questioned by Carl Myers in his 
Affidavit filed with the trial court (R. 37-38). 
The second claim of Carl Myers is that he thought the 
telephone conversations was a sufficient answer to the 
Complaint. The summons which was served on Carl 
Myers specifically informed him that it was necessary to 
file an answer "in writing with the clerk of the court" (R. 
4 
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45). In addition, during a telephone conversation with 
counsel for Pacer Cycle he was again informed that he 
was obligated to file an answer to the Complaint (R. 35). 
On the basis of this information, it is impossible for him 
to reasonably conclude that the telephone conversation 
itself was an answer to the Complaint since during that 
conversation he stated that he refused to answer (R. 35). 
During this same conversation he was further informed 
of the consequences of not filing an answer: that a default 
judgment would be taken against him which could be 
satisfied by execution upon his property (R. 35). This tele-
phone conversation was prior to the expiration of the time 
for filing an answer, and long before a default judgment 
was taken. 
Carl Myers complains that the delay of one year be-
tween service of summons and default judgment in some 
way justifies setting the default judgment aside. The 
reason for the delay arose by reason of attempts by Pacer 
Cycle and its assignee to locate Frank Myers and the 
collateral. As will be noted later, the collateral was dis-
mantled and the parts located have a mechanics' lien 
against them. Frank Myers has never been located. The 
answer to the Complaint on behalf of Frank Myers was 
filed without service of summons upon him and after de-
fault judgment had been taken against his father, Carl 
Myers. 
If anything, the delay in taking default judgment is 
further evidence of the absence of excusable neglect since 
it gave Carl Myers every opportunity to respond and assert 
any defenses at a proper stage of the proceedings. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DENIAL OF APPELLANTS MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS WITH-
IN SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
The only provisions of law justifying the setting 
aside of the default judgment are contained in Rule 60 (b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules provide 
for relief from a final judgment for reasons of "Mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" or "any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
ment." 
It is apparent from the uncontroverted facts, that 
none of these grounds exist in the instant case. For this 
reason, the denial of the motion to set aside the judgment 
was a proper exercise of the discretion of the trial court. 
Since Carl Myers was specifically informed as to his 
obligation to provide a written answer to the Complaint, 
was correctly advised as to the consequences in failing to 
act, and was given ample time in which to act, there are 
no grounds whatsoever to reasonably argue that his failure 
to answer was by reason of mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, excusable neglect or any other reason which would 
justify relief from the judgment. Carl Myers had every 
opportunity to present any meritorious defense and will-
fully and knowingly refused to answer. 
6 
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The sole excuse for failing to answer the Complaint 
is the claim that Carl Myers considered the telephone con-
versation with attorney for Pacer Cycle as constituting the 
court answer. (R. 37). If this constitutes neglect, it is far 
from "excusable neglect," since during the course of that 
conversation Carl Myers was informed that a formal 
answer was required and he specifically stated that he 
refused to make such an answer (R. 35). Having refused 
to answer, he cannot reasonably contend that he deemed 
the conversation to constitute an answer. Since he specifi-
cally refused to take any action, he could not have assumed 
4
 that the action was already being taken. Willful conduct 
cannot constitute "neglect." It follows with even greater 
force that willful conduct cannot constitute "excusable 
neglect." 
The situation involved in the instant case is similar 
to that involved in Board of Education v. Cox, 14 Utah 
2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (1963). In that case the defendant 
claimed he failed to answer the Complaint because he was 
of the opinion that it was invalid because it had not been 
signed by the trial judge. This Court upheld the action of 
the trial court in refusing to set aside the default judg-
ment. The basis of the decision was as follows: 
"The trial judge was in an advantaged posi-
tion to judge the defendant's creditability. In view 
of his interest, the court was not obliged to believe 
the somewhat feeble excuse he gave him for not 
paying attention to the summons: that he thought 
it required a judge's signature. The summons is 
self explanatory to anyone who can read, and this 
7 
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excuse is so unrealistic that the trial judge was not 
compelled to accept it . . . In view of these facts 
the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Cox's failure 
to heed the summons was his deliberate choice does 
not seem unreasonable." {Emphasis added] 
In the instant case, the summons clearly states that 
the answer must be in writing (R. 45). So, as in the Cox 
case, a conclusion to the contrary is unreasonable and 
therefore does not constitute excusable neglect. The instant 
case is a much more flagrant disregard of the obligation 
to answer since, unlike the Cox case, the defendant in this 
case was specifically told of his obligation and clearly 
stated his deliberate intention not to respond to the sum-
mons. 
If illness is not excusable neglect, Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), certainly 
knowingly refusing to answer a Complaint does not con-
stitute excusable neglect. Moreover, it has been specifi-
cally held that where notice of intent to take default 
judgment is communicated to the adverse party prior to 
taking the judgment, there is no claim for excusable neg-
lect. Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573 
(1962). 
The question is one presented to the discretion of the 
trial judge, and will be set aside only if there is a clear 
abuse of discretion. Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 
303 P.2d 995 (1956); Masters v. LeSeuer supra; Mayheiv v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 
(1962). The facts before the court give no basis for a 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
finding that the trial court abused its discretion in 
these circumstances. It is apparent that the trial court 
found that Carl Myers willfully and knowingly refused to 
answer the Complaint after being fully advised of his 
obligation to do so and the consequences thereof. This 
court will not substitute its discretion for that of the trial 
court. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 
741(1953). 
On page 6 of his brief, Carl Myers argues that Pacer 
Cycle's attorney admits a valid dispute between the parties. 
A reading of the Affidavit of Pacer's attorney illustrates 
that the argument is taken out of context. The statement 
was made to demonstrate the nature in which Carl Myers 
version of the facts expands with the passage of time and 
not as an admission of a valid issue between the parties. 
Carl Myers further argues that by reason of alleged 
valid disputes, the judgment should be set aside. Pacer 
asserts that the time for asserting valid disputes or de-
fenses has long since past and Carl Myers was given every 
opportunity to assert the defenses at a proper state of the 
proceeding. By asserting the claimed defenses at this 
point in time he is merely carrying forth his orig-
inal plan to willfully and knowingly delay the proceed-
ings and respond at his own convenience. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF LAW IN 
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under point II of his brief, Myers again attempts to 
assert defenses which should have been asserted in the 
answer which he willfully refused to file. There are two 
errors in this argument: 
(a) The proper time for asserting defenses noted in 
Myers' brief have long since past. The sole issue before 
the court is whether the default should be set aside, not 
an argument of the merits of the case; 
(b) Myers argument is based not only upon facts not 
in the record, but upon facts which are totally false. 
(a) Sole issue is discretion of Trial Court 
It is the clear intent of the Rules of Procedure to re-
quire defendant to assert any defenses in the trial court. 
Carl Myers has willfully refused to assert his defenses at 
the proper stage of the proceeding and now seeks to assert 
them for the first time to this Court after judgment. 
The issue to be determined is not the validity of the 
defenses but whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in refusing to set aside a default judgment after a finding 
that the defendant has willfully refused to answrer the 
Complaint after being put on notice that default judgment 
would be taken and the consequences of such a judgment. 
This Court has clearly held that in reviewing an order 
refusing to set aside a default judgment, the only consid-
erations are the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
failure to answer. The court will not review the merits of 
the case: 
10 
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"We are concerned only with why he did not 
answer, not with what kind of answer would he 
give if he were so inclined. This latter question 
arises only after consideration of the first question 
and a sufficient excuse therefrom being shown. 
Board of Education v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 
P.2d 806 (1963) [emphasis added]. 
(b) Defenses are based on a false set of facts 
The main import of Myers' brief centers around a 
wrongful repossession of the motorcycle. It seems odd that 
Carl Myers would rely on facts that he is unwilling to 
verify under oath. Nowhere in his Affidavit, or in any 
other affidavit, was there any statement that a reposses-
sion had ever taken place. 
The only evidence of a repossession is at R. 50. The 
document (R. 50) was prepared in March, 1973 on errone-
ous information that the motorcycle had been repossessed 
in January, 1973. However, after checking the facts it 
was discovered that the repossession was of another motor-
cycle possessed by another buyer. For this reason, the 
document at R. 50 was never notarized and was included 
*
!>e Complaint by error. The document is not re-
ferred to at all in the Complaint. 
Since Myers never raised the repossession argument 
in the trial court, Pacer Cycle had no opportunity or reason 
to clarify the question of whether a repossession had taken 
place. 
In order to avoid expending time and effort of the 
Court on the basis of a misunderstanding of the facts, 
Pacer Cycle has obtained Affidavits from the persons in-
11 
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volved on the question of repossession. If Pacer Cycle's 
motion to supplement the record under Rule 75 (h), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, is granted, Affidavits stating 
that no repossession ever took place will be on file with 
the Court. The Affidavits establish that neither Pacer 
Cycle nor its assignee, Zions Bank, or any other person has 
ever repossessed the motorcycle involved. The motorcycle 
has been dismantled and there is a mechanics' lien against 
the parts that have been located. 
CONCLUSION 
The sole issue before the Court is whether the cir-
cumstances surrounding the defendant's failure to answer 
constitute excusable neglect. The affidavits submitted by 
Pacer Cycle set forth these facts and they are not ques-
tioned or controverted by Carl Myers' Affidavit. These 
facts demonstrate that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding there was no excusable neglect justify-
ing the defendant's refusal to answer. 
Respectfully submitted, 
rWALEK^XHOLBROOK 
8c MCDONOUGH \ * 
By 
jbert M. McDonald 
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